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Abstract
In this paper,we construct an equilibrium search model of the labor
market augmented to include lump sum taxes that nance government
expenditures. Using the model, we can decompose the decline in labor
force participation (LFP) into the policy e¤ect (state provided income)
and that of other factors such as declining economic output. The model
is estimated using census data on labor market outcomes and welfare
income in Ohio. We learn that if the economy resembled the pre-crisis
period, the decrease in welfare income during the Kasich administration
would have led to a small increase in LFP.
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1 Introduction
Governor John Kasich spent nearly two decades in Congress before winning
election as Ohio Governor for the rst time in 2010. He won re-election by
an overwhelming 30 points in 2014. By September 2015, the unemployment
rate in Ohio was down to 4.5%, according to data compiled by the Federal
Reserve, a signicant improvement from near 9.0% when John Kasich took
o¢ ce in 2011 and Ohios joblessness and the national rate were tied. How
much of this improvement can be credited to the Governor John Kasich and his
administration?
Since 2005 (before the Great-recession), labor force participation has been on
a decline both in Ohio and in the rest of the nation. During the same period,
in the state of Ohio, the share of General Revenue Fund (GRF) disbursements
that went to Public Assistance and Medicaid has increased. The GRF only
represents just under half of the money the state spends. It represents those
funds which are most exible, in most cases not designated for a specic purpose,
and so the state has more discretion over the allocation of these funds. On
one hand, Governor Kasich cut taxes. On the other hand, despite an overall
decrease in spending, transfers to households in the form of public assistance
which already dominated GRF expenditures, have been on the rise. The 2014
gure represents a 13.82% increase compared to 2007 under the last conservative
governor. GRF disbursement tables for 2007, 2011, 2012 and 2014 are included
in the appendix.
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In this article, we compare labor market outcomes well before and after gov-
ernor John Kasich. Using an equilibrium search model of the labor market,
we estimate the value of labor force participation (LFP) that is consistent with
welfare income in Ohio before (under governor Taft) and after governor Kasich.
By holding output constant to pre-recession levels, we can recover the e¤ect of
a change in welfare income on labor force participation. Our model allows us
to decompose labor force participation into the policy e¤ect and that of other
factors such as a declining economic output. Did the value of employment in-
come decrease relative to welfare income due to the economic climate or because
of government policy? We then provide a discussion about the labor market
e¤ects of welfare spending in the long run.
Existing studies regarding the e¤ect of scal policy on labor market outcomes
are worth mentioning. Ravn and Simonelli (2007) nd that expansionary scal
policy stimulates employment and lowers unemployment. Bruckner and Pappa
(2011) provide evidence that unemployment rates can also increase as a result of
a scal expansion due to increased labor force participation. To reconcile theory
with evidence, they add the participation margin in a New Keynesian model with
labor market frictions as in Ravn (2008). In their framework, due to sticky
prices, the increase in government spending generates a labor demand e¤ect and
so more workers enter the market since in times of high labor demand, their
probability of nding a job increases. Their result relies on the following key
assumptions: (1) price stickiness in the short run causes real wages to increase
when government expenditures causes an increase in aggregate demand which
3
in turn causes labor demand to increase (2) All workers who are not employed
(insiders and outsiders) whether participating or not, collect unemployment
benets in their framework which is also key to generating increases in labor
force participation.
A long list of literature has highlighted the postive e¤ects of welfare reform
on labor force participation. Lubotsky (2004) provides empirical evidence that
the 1991 elimination of the General Assistance program in Michigan contributed
to a 2-4% increase in LFP among high school dropouts (low skilled workers).
For a complete review of this literature, see Bartik (2000).
The main challenge in measuring the e¤ect of a scal expansion is caused
by the fact that although government expenditures a¤ect economic variables
which in turn also a¤ect scal policy and the size of government transfers to
households. A scal expansion is the outcome of a decrease in economic activity
that leads to an increase in the claimant count. With these issues in mind, we
construct a dynamic equilibrium search model of the labor market augmented
to include the labor force participation decision and a government budget. We
impose a balanced government budget such that any increase in government
spending must be fully funded by lump sum taxes. In our model, we distinguish
between job seekers allowance (unemployment benets) which incentivizes labor
force participation and welfare transfers to inactive households that reward the
welfare scrounge.
In our model, an increase in the value of welfare transfers leads to a decline
in labor force participation (LFP) since less unemployment compensation im-
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plies lower job search subsidies. On the positive side, when the labor market
becomes less congested, the job nding rate increases and the unemployment
rate falls. The problem arises from the fact that since LFP declined, even
though workers nd jobs at a faster rate, fewer workers are actually in employ-
ment. This decrease in the stock of employed workers causes tax revenues to
decrease and so the unemployment benet falls, reducing the job search incen-
tive further. This negative e¤ect on job search incentives is exacerbated by
poor economic conditions i.e. a decline in output. It is in fact well documented
that higher unemployment insurance subsidizes job search thus causing both
higher participation incentives despite longer spells of unemployment (see the
search theoretic literature on unemployment insurance). On the rm side, jobs
are created so long as the surplus is non-negative. This implies that decrease
in the surplus leads to a decrease in the number of new vacancies.
State welfare transfers discourage labor force participation of less able work-
ers. A recession exacerbates the negative e¤ects of welfare spending since total
government revenues fall during a recession for two reasons: (1) the government
is not allowed to borrow in our framework and (2) an increase in taxes causes
the surplus to decrease. As a result, fewer vacancies are created, the job nding
rate decreases leading to a higher jobless rate at lower levels of welfare income.
Our quantitative analysis reveals that the value of welfare income decreased
under governor Kasich and so the observed increase in public assistance spending
is due mostly to economic conditions outside of the administrations control.
In the next section, we present stylized facts about the Ohio economy and
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the rest of the US states which will be used for our quantitative analysis. In
section 3, we introduce our model. In section 4, we present our quantitative
analysis and a discussion of the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
For our analysis, we use IPUMS USA complete samples for 2007 and 2014. We
restrict our analysis to heads of households in the working age population (age
25-54). We choose ages 25-54 because these individuals should be in the labor
force however by 2014, only 88% were active market participants in Ohio.
Figure 1: Labor Force Participation
Unemployment rates followed the rest of the nation during the recession.
The following gures illustrate the unemployment rate.
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Figure 2: Unemployment
Figure 3 shows the percentage of heads of households receiving state income.
Figure 3: State income recipients
In gure 4, we distinguish between income to unemployed heads of house-
holds and income to individuals who are not participating.
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Figure 4: Welfare income to Unemployment income
In table 1, we compare cross-sections under both regimes.
Table 1: Ohio Labor Market 2007 2014
LFP rate 0.8786 0.8723
Unemployment rate 0.0456 0.0454
Real mean hourly wage 20.01 24.40
Job Separation rate 0.037 0.034
Inactive reporting welfare income 0.1214 0.1277
Welfare/UI 1.034 1.013
3 The Model
Time is discrete. The economy is populated with agents of denoted by Ns.
All agents live T  2 periods and discount the future at rate  = e(1   
),
where 
 is the rate at which agents exit the economy. Agents can stay out
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of the market, they can enter the market and become employed or end up
unemployed. The superscript s 2 fn; e; ugdenotes the state of workers for not
participating, employed or unemployed respectively. The surplus is dened as
S = x Rw  Rf , where x is the output produced by a successful match, Rw is
the workers reservation value and Rf is the value of the rms outside option
i.e. the cost of posting a vacancy (assuming free entry). Employed workers
earn a wage w. Employed workers are taxed a lump sum tax w. Each period
the government collects tax revenues spent on unemployment benets and other
forms of household transfers. There is no government borrowing and so the tax
rate balances the government budget constraint each period.
Agents in our economy solve the following problem:
V s = maxE0
TX
t=0
tU(Ct) (1)
where Ct is the periods consumption.
3.1 The Labor Market
At the matching stage, vacancies and workers who are searching are matched
through the following matching process. A vacancy searching meets an appli-
cant with probability q()where q : R+ ! [0; 1] is a twice-di¤erentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly concave function with boundary conditions q(0) = 0 and
q(1) = 1. Similarly, a worker in a given submarket meets a vacancy with
probability () = q()=, (0) = 0 and (1) = 1. We refer to  as the queue
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of applicants, that is the ratio of workers to available vacancies (the inverse of
the labor market tightness). We dene the "queue" as:
  
u
v

(2)
where u denotes unemployed workers, v is the mass of vacancies and  is a
matching e¢ ciency parameter.
The probability that a vacancy receives at least one applicant is:
q() = 1  exp( ) (3)
We now dene the probability that a worker nds a job as:
() =
q()

(4)
3.2 Value Functions
3.2.1 Workers
The value of an unemployed worker is:
V u = Rw   + ()V e(w) (5)
where  is a search cost and
Rw = A+ b+ V
u (6)
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In other words, if an unemployed worker is not lucky in the labor market,
he obtains the unemployment benet and gets to search again in the following
period.
The value of an employed worker is:
V e(w) = w   w + [(1  )V e(w) + Rw] (7)
The value of a worker who does not participate in the labor market is:
V n = A+ & Tw + (V
u   ) (8)
where & is the claimant rate, Tw is the value of welfare income provided by the
state and  is a cost for delaying market entry (assumption: experience im-
proves market prospects). The transfer can be interpreted as public assistance,
disability benets i.e. the share of government spending that is enjoyed by the
inactive share of the working age population.
The probability that an agent enters the labor market is   Pr[  ]
where the threshold   V n V u.  is assumed to be i.i.d and symmetric about
its mean and can represent unobserved idiosyncratic ability or perhaps other
unobserved characteristics that make some individuals more likely to participate
in the labor market.
The workers problem at the start of each period is:
V = max
f;g
fV u; V ng (9)
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3.2.2 Firms
The value of a vacant job is:
JV =  k + q()JF (10)
The value of a lled job us:
JF = x  w + [(1  )JF ] (11)
We assume free entry and so vacancies are created until the surplus is exhausted
such that:
k = q()JF (12)
3.3 The Government Sector
Given the public assistance to households, the government must choose the tax
rate that balances its budget.
Tax revenues each period are paid by the employed population:
T = wN
e (13)
where Ne =  () N
G = Nub+Nn & Tw (14)
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where Nu =  [1  ()] N , Nn = (1 )N .
Given b and Tw,
w =
T
Ne
=
G
Ne
(15)
The government budget constraint is binding and so the tax w is chosen
such that T = G.
3.4 Equilibrium
Given the state of the economy: output per worker, x, the government policy
regarding welfare Twb , the claimant rate, &, the search costs ,  and aggregate
risk , an equilibrium consists of a choice of: a queue fg, a tax schedule fwg
such that workers maximize, rms maximize (the value functions are satised)
and the government budget is balanced.
3.5 Algorithm
For any given level Tw and b
 Set an initial guess for the tax fwg
 Guess on the population that enters the labor market
 Compute the queue and the implied job nding rates from the matching
technology described in the earlier section of the paper
 Using the job nding rate, update the value of workers, rms and compute
tax revenues as well as government expenditures.
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 Check that the government constraint holds otherwise update the tax
 Using the model outcomes, update the initial population guesses and it-
erate until convergence. A steady state equilibrium is reached when the
job nding rates are constant after each iteration, i.e. the model outcome
has converged to the inital guess and so the fraction of workers who par-
ticipate in the market each period is constant. In addition, the tax is such
that the government runs a balanced budget.
4 Quantitative Analysis
For our analysis, we divide parameters into xed parameters which are observed
and directly taken from the data and free parameters which are estimated to
match moments from the same data. Our xed parametersTwb from US census
income variable,  chosen to match US yearly interest rate, job separations are
US annual average from BLS job openings and labor turnover survey. The
following parameters: A = 1; b = 1;  = 0:1 are classed as normalized since the
value (level) of these parameters does not a¤ect the results.
There are four free parameters fx; ; ; 
g chosen to match real wage,
labor force participation rate, hiring rate and unemployment rate respectively.
Tables containing the value of xed parameters and estimated parameters are
included in the appendix.
The following table show the estimated gains from labor force participation
in Ohio in 2007 and in 2014.
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Table 2: Results
2007 Twb = 1:034 2014
Tw
b = 1:013
(V u   V n) 35.6171 (V u   V n) 36.5832
V u 40.6163 V u 42.3258
V n 4.9993 V n 5.7427
Table 3 highlights results from a counterfactual: What would the labor
market look like under Governor Kasich if economic conditions resembled the
pre-crisis period? Holding parameters xed at their 2007 levels, we investigate
the e¤ect of the change in Twb to the 2014 ratio
Table 3: Change in Welfare Income in Ohio
Estimated LFP The Labor Market Twb = 1:013
(V u   V n) 35.6641 LFP rate 0.8790
V u 40.6406 Unemployment rate 0.0456
V n 4.9765 Wage 19.997
Our results indicate that if economic conditions resembled the pre-crisis pe-
riod, LFP would have been only slightly higher under governor Kasich. The de-
crease in welfare transfers is small suggesting that more welfare cuts are needed.
4.1 Discussion: Welfare Income
In this section we compare steady state outcomes to investigate the e¤ects of
an increase in the value of government transfers to inactive households. As the
share of tax revenues that goes to inactive households increases at the expense of
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benets to job seekers, fewer workers enter the labor market. Those who enter
are also more likely to nd a job since the labor market becomes less congested
(see g. 5).
Figure 5: The e¤ect of welfare income
5 Conclusion
In this article, we construct a dynamic equilibrium search model of the labor
market augmented to include a government sector. We learn that an increase
in the share of government revenues that is spent on welfare programs can
cause labor force participation to decrease. Welfare transfers discourage labor
force participation of less able workers. Although taxes increase, fewer workers
become employed and so tax revenues fall. As a result, the larger inactive
population is left equally sharing the decreased total tax revenue. Our results
are particularly interesting since policymakers who are concerned with reducing
16
inequality often advocate for increases in welfare spending.
Using Census data for the state of Ohio, we learn that if economic conditions
in 2014 resembled the pre-crisis period, welfare transfers under governor Kasich
would have led to a small increase in labor force participation (less than 1%).
The model results suggest that more aggressive welfare cuts are needed. The
simplicity of our reduced form model provides a great tool for educators and
policymakers. The model can easily be extended to answer a substantial number
of related policy questions.
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APPENDIX
Model Parameters
Fixed parameters are in table 4 and 5. Estimated Parameters are in table
6 and 7.
Table 4: Ohio2007
Public Assistance Income Tw=b = 1:0343
Claimant rate & = 0:1214
Job Separations  = 0:037
Table 5: Ohio2014
Public Assistance Income Tw=b = 1:0127
Claimant rate & = 0:1277
Job Separations  = 0:034
Table 6: Ohio2007 Data Target
Output per worker x = 24:5316 Wage income
Matching function parameter  = 0:0425 Hire rate
Search Cost  = 1:5878 LFP rate
Discouraged workers 
 = 0:0093 Unemployment rate
Table 7: Ohio2014 Data Target
Output per worker x = 26:0109 Wage income
Matching function parameter  = 0:0406 Hire rate
Search Cost  = 2:0628 LFP rate
Discouraged workers 
 = 0:0057 Unemployment rate
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The General Revenue Fund
In tables 8a, 8b and 8c, we compare changes in the General Revenue Fund
(GRF) Expenditures in real terms between 2007 and 2014. Ohio State General
Revenue fund disbursements can be obtained from the Ohio O¢ ce of Budget
and Management (http://obm.ohio.gov/Budget/monthlynancial/default.aspx).
The share of disbursements that go to Public Assistance and Medicaid has
increased.
Table 8a : Disbursements (in thousands) 2007/CPI=582.343 (1967=100)
Education 4,788,797 (8223.33)
Public Assistance and Medicaid 5,290,167 (9084.28)
Health and Human Services 658,754 (1131.21)
Community and Economic Development 85,227 (146.35)
Tax relief/Property tax reimbursement 617,254 (1059.95)
Other Expenditures 1,579,460 (2712.25)
Total 13,019,659 (22357.37)
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Table 8b : Disbursements (in thousands) 2014/CPI=706.977
Education 4,645,563 (6571.02)
Public Assistance and Medicaid 7,310,019 (10339.83)
Health and Human Services 653,057 (923.73)
Community and Economic Development -
Tax relief/Property tax reimbursement 893,067 (1263.22)
Other Expenditures 1,880,872 (2660.44)
Total 15,382,578 (21758.23)
In 2007, Public assistance and Medicaid made up 40.6% of all GRF disburse-
ments, up to 47.5 % of GRF disbursements in 2014. Total GRF disbursements
decreased by 2.68%, however spending on public assistance and medicaid in-
creased by 13.82%.
Table 8c : Disbursements (in thousands) 2011 2012
Education 4,704,566 4,621,675
Public Assistance and Medicaid 5,860,256 6,765,225
Health and Human Services 592,201 555, 938
Community and Economic Development 55,835 47,411
Tax relief/Property tax reimbursement 841,655 865,060
Other Expenditures 1,602,883 1,350,212
Total 13,657,396 14,205,521
Table 8c reveals that Public assistance made up 42% of the GRF actual
disbursements in 2011 and 47.6% of expenditures in 2012.
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Table 8d: Receipts (in thousands) 2007 2014
Tax Receipts 8,695,846 (14392.5) 9,968,148 (14099.7)
Non-Tax Receipts 2,971,687 (5102.98) 4,618,300 (6532.46)
Transfers 255,986 (439.58) 52,730 (74.59)
Table 8d reveals that tax receipts decreased by 2.03% in real terms while it
is non-tax receipts that in fact have contributed to the increase in the General
Revenue Fund receipts. Most of this increase in non-tax receipts was pro-
vided by the Federal government in the form of grants and reimbursement to
the state for certain GRF expenditures made by the Department of Job and
Family Services. In 2007 non-tax receipts made up 25.6% of all receipts while
in 2014, these federal grants made up 31.6% of all receipts. Taking ination
into account, we learn from the tables that GRF Expenditures are 2.68% below
expenditures during the pre-recession Taft administration. Despite an over-
all decrease, public assistance and medicaid are 13.82% higher in 2014 under
Governor Kasich than under Governor Taft in 2007.
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